As soon as the book starts, Bourdieu takes off and launches into all his ideas, all at once. He invents new terms without giving clear definitions and also redefines normal words without first alerting you that he’s done that. Even when things seem clear, his flailing organization means critical caveats might show up in the middle of a paragraph 90 pages later. And did I mention that the sentences are hilariously long and branching and ponderous?
敲除GnRH神经元里的Rank → 小鼠一切正常；用药物耗竭所有小胶质细胞 → 生殖发育被破坏；只在下丘脑小胶质细胞里敲除Rank → 小鼠出现和全身敲除一模一样的HH表型。
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Distinguishing between relational wrongdoing and moral responsibility for causing unjust damage (that is, infringing rights against injury) requires fixing some terms. In ordinary moral discourse, terms such as “duty,” “right,” and “wrong” are polysemous. The term “duty,” as it is most commonly used, refers to a sort of norm of conduct, or standard of behavior, which tells us to refrain from acting in a certain way. A moral duty, so understood, is largely or exclusively an evidence-relative phenomenon: It reflects those reasons that are accessible to an agent from her epistemic and deliberative position.39 To violate a duty owed to another person is thus to wrong or mistreat her by giving insufficient weight in one’s moral deliberation to moral reasons that reflect her status as a “self-originating source[] of claims.”40 Sometimes the term “right” is used as a synonym or conceptual flipside of “duty” (and thus the correlative of “wrong”): To violate a duty owed to another person just is to violate her right and to wrong her. This is the usage that Cardozo himself seems to have had in mind when he spoke of duties, rights, and wrongs in Palsgraf, and defenders of the Palsgraf perspective largely follow him in this regard.41
（本报记者罗珊珊、杨颜菲采访整理）